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Abstract.  A case study of the difficulties  encountered in the design  of hi- 
erarchical,  hybrid control systems is presented. As our example we use the 
Intelligent  Vehicle Highway System (IVHS) architecture proposed for vehicle 
platooning,  a system that involves both continuous  state and discrete event 
controllers.  We point out that even though conventional  analysis tools sug- 
gest that the proposed design should fulfill certain performance requirements, 
simulation results show that it does not.  We consider  this as an indication 
that the conventional  tools currently in use for the design and verification  of 
control systems may be inadequate for the design of hierarchical controllers 
for hybrid systems. The analysis  also indicates  certain shortcomings of the 
current IVHS design.  We propose solutions  to fix these problems. 
Keywords:  Intelligent  Vehicle Highway  Systems,  Hybrid  Control  Systems, 
Safety, Verification. 
1  Introduction 
The term hybrid system is used  to describe  a  large and  varied class of systems. A 
large class of hybrid systems can  be described  by  the  architecture  of Figure 1.  A 
typical hybrid system is  arranged in  two  (or more) layers [10, 24].  Different levels 
of abstractions  of the  plant  model are  used  at  each layer of the  hierarchy.  In  the 
bottom layer the plant  model is usually described  by means of differential  and/or 
difference equations. This level contains the actual plant and any conventional con- 
trollers working at the same level of abstraction. In the top layer the plant description 
is more abstract. Typical choices of description language at this level are finite state 
machines, fuzzy logic, Petri nets etc. Typically the controllers designed  at this level 
are discrete  event supervisory controllers  (see e.g.,  [30]).  The  two levels communi- 
cate by means of an interface that plays the role of a translator between signals and 
symbols. As  the  techniques  for control  design  and  verification  are  well developed 
for the continuous  and discrete systems, the design of the interface is of the utmost 
importance because it determines the way in which the combined system behaves. 
Of course in a  general hierarchical structure  more than two levels may exist.  If 
this is the case, the structure of Figure 1 can be viewed as the interaction  between 
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Fig. 1. Hybrid System Architecture 
any two of the layers. Alternatively the Discrete Event layer can be assumed to be a 
lumped version of all the layers that are not part of the continuous domain. Typically 
in a  multilayered hierarchy, as we move up the hierarchy system description gets 
more abstract  (e.g., closer to linguistic), information is condensed (i.e., a signal in 
the higher levels encodes many facts about the lower levels)  and commands become 
more descriptive (i.e., a single command at a high level induces many actions at the 
lower levels). 
The control architecture described above appears in wide variety of applications 
and forms the heart of most hybrid system formalisms. Switching controllers [22, 23], 
Expert Control [27], Intelligent Control [19, 26], Motion Control [5], among others, 
make use of the structure of Figure 1. For most of these systems the design approach 
has been  "divide and conquer", that is the continuous and discrete controllers are 
designed independently and then combined by an interface which is designed for the 
specific problem. This is not a rule however,  as the literature also contMns examples 
of systems that show a~tive (on-line) design of the hybrid controllers (e.g., [4] and 
[25]) as well as attempts of formulating a consistent interface that is not case specific 
(e.g., [6]). In addition to theoretical formalisms a lot of work has also been done on 
techniques for simulating hierarchical, hybrid systems (e.g., [3] and [33]). 
In this paper we present a case study of the design of hybrid control systems. We 168 
illustrate the problems associated with their design and verification by means of an 
example, the Intelligent Vehicle Highway System (IVHS) designed in the framework 
of the PATH project. Our goal is to illustrate that the "divide and conquer" approach 
to  hybrid system design  is  not  always effective. The  results  we present  indicate 
that for multitayered control structures there is a need for an independent proof of 
performance for the combined system, in addition to the usual proofs in the discrete 
and continuous domains. In the next section we outline the overall structure of the 
IVHS architecture that is used in this study. More details on the parts of the design 
that are relevant to this study will be given in Section 3. 
2  Intelligent  Vehicle  Highway  System  Architecture 
One example where the  hybrid system structure  of Figure 1 can  be found is the 
Intelligent Vehicle  Highway System described  in  [34, 35]. The goal is to design a 
system that can significantly increase safety and highway capacity without having 
to build new roads, by adding intelligence to both the vehicles and the roadside. In 
order to achieve this, the concept of "platooning" is introduced in [35]. It is assumed 
that traffic on the highway is organized in groups of tightly spaced vehicles, called 
platoons. Intuition suggests that this should lead to an increase in the capacity and 
throughput  of the highway; indeed  theoretical studies indicate  that  the  capacity 
increase if such a scheme is implemented successfully will be substantial (as high as 
four times the current capacity). What may be more surprising is that this will be 
done without a negative impact on passenger safety. By having the vehicles within 
a platoon follow each other with a small intra-platoon separation of about 1 meter, 
we guarantee that, if there is a failure and an impact is unavoidable, the relative 
speed of the vehicles involved in the collision will be small, hence the damage will be 
minimized. The inter-platoon separation, on the other hand, is large (of the order of 
30 meters)  to physically isolate the platoons from each other. This ensures that, if 
needed, the platoons will have enough time to come to a stop before they collide. In 
addition a large separation guarantees that transient decelerations will be attenuated 
as they propagate up the freeway. 
2.1  Control hierarchy 
Clearly, implementation of such a scheme would require the vehicles to be automat- 
icalty controlled, as human drivers are not fast and reliable enough to be  able to 
form platoons. The design of such a  large scale control system poses a  formidable 
problem. In the architecture outlined in [35] the system is organized in five layers. 
The block diagram of Figure 2 shows different layers of the control hierarchy. 
The  top  layer, called the  network  layer, is  responsible  for the flow of traf- 
fic on the entire highway system  2.  Its task is to prevent congestion and maximize 
throughput by dynamic routing of traffic. 
2 The highway system might consist of the intercormection of several highways around an 
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The second layer, called the llnk layer, coordinates the operation of whole sec- 
tions (links) of the highway. Its primary task is to maximize throughput while main- 
taining  safe conditions  of operation. With  these  criteria in  mind, it  calculates  an 
optimum platoon  size  and  an  optimum velocity for each  highway section.  It  also 
decides which lanes the vehicles should follow to get to their destination as fast as 
possible. Finally, it monitors incidents on the highway and diverts traffic in order to 
minimize the impact of the incident on traffic flow and safety. Because the link layer 
bases its control actions on large numbers of vehicles, it inevitably has to use some 
form of aggregate information. Therefore it treats the vehicles in a  section statisti- 
cally, rather than considering the state of individual vehicles or platoons. Likewise, 
the commands it issues are not addressed to individual vehicles but rather to all the 
vehicles in the section; a typical command would be "30% of the vehicles that wish 
to get off the highway at the next exit should change lanes now" or "all platoons in 
this section should try to be 10 vehicles long". 
The next  level below the  link layer is the  coordination  layer. Its task is to 
coordinate the operation of platoons with their neighbors. It receives the link layer 
commands and translates them to specific maneuvers that the platoons need to carry 
out. For example, it will ask two platoons to merge to a single platoon whose size is 
closer to the optimum or, given a command like  "30% of the vehicles going to the 170 
next exit change lanes now", it will decide which vehicles will comprise this 30% and 
split the platoons accordingly to let them out. The current design [16] uses protocols, 
in the form of finite state machines, to organize the maneuvers in a systematic way. 
They receive the commands of the link layer and aggregated sensor information from 
the individual vehicles (of the form "there is a vehicle in the adjacent lane"). They 
then use this information to decide on a control policy and issue commands to the 
regulation layer. The commands are typically of the form "accelerate to merge to 
the preceding platoon" or  "decelerate so that another vehicle may move into your 
lane ahead of you". 
Below the coordination layer lies the regulation layer. Its task is to receive the 
coordination layer commands and translate them to throttle, steering and braking 
input  for the  actuators  on  the  vehicle.  For this  purpose  it  utilizes  a  number of 
continuous time feedback control laws ([9, 12, 28, 32]) that use the readings provided 
by the sensors to calculate the actuator inputs required for a particular maneuver. 
The regulation layer occasionally needs to communicate with the coordination layer 
to inform it of the outcome of the maneuver. 
The bottom layer is not part of the controller. It is called the physical layer 
and it contains the actual plant  (in this case the vehicles with their sensors, actua- 
tors and communication equipment and the highway topology). For the purposes of 
simulation it can be assumed that the physical layer contains models of the actual 
physical quantities. From a hybrid systems point of view, the physical layer can be 
merged with the reguiation layer. 
2.2  Hybrid control problem 
The current paper focuses on the coordination and regulation layers and their in- 
teraction. Our aim is to demonstrate that the behavior of the overall hybrid control 
system may display characteristics, possibly undesirable, that are not predicted by 
analyzing the individual layers. In order to do this we will first describe  briefly a 
possible IVHS design for which a dedicated simulation tool has been developed. In 
Section 3.1, the results in [9] that describe a possible design for the regulation layer 
are presented, while in Section 3.2 we give an outline of the results in [16] where the 
design of the coordination layer is described.  Finally in Section 3.3 we discuss  the 
results in [20] where an interface between these two layers is presented.  References 
to alternative designs are also provided. 
The references provide proofs of performance bounds for the individual layers. 
Still however no proof of performance for the overall design exists. The only means 
available for testing it at the moment is the SmartPath simulator [7]. In Section 4 
of this report we present  the results of extensive simulations performed using this 
tool. It  turns  out  that  the  performance of the combined system is not  quite  the 
expected.  In  particular,  situations  arise  indicating limitations of the  design  that 
were not predicted by the individual layer analysis. Even though ways of designing 
around these shortcoming exist in most cases, it becomes apparent that if any faith 
is  to be  placed in  the  overall design  some way of systematically determining its 
performance and limitations must be found. The failure of the standard tools (both 
in the finite state and the continuous domain) to predict the limitations discovered 171 
by means of simulation indicates that new, more powerful tools are needed to achieve 
this goal. Our current work focuses on the development of such tools. 
3  Design  of Individual  Layers 
In  this  section we  will give a  brief description of the  multilayered control design 
that was implemented in the SmartPath simulator. We focus our attention on the 
regulation (continuous) and coordination (discrete) layers and their interface. 
It  should  be  noted that  extensive work has  also  been  done  in  the  link  layer 
design  (see [31]) while work is already in progress for the network layer. The link 
layer control scheme has  also been  added  to the  SmartPath simulator. However, 
the  simulation results  presented  here were obtained  using  a  simplified version of 
SmartPath where the detailed link layer design is substituted by a small number of 
simple rules; for example such a rule might be  "all vehicles coming in the freeway 
should move to the fast lane and stay there until they are one mile from their exit". 
The justification for this simplification is that we are interested in the interaction 
of the two bottom layers of the control architecture and the problems it pauses as a 
hybrid system and do not want the link layer intelligence to "pollute" this behavior. 
A few more thoughts on the merits of a simplistic abstraction for the link layer are 
given in Section 4.5. 
It  should also be  noted that  the IVHS  design  presented  here is  by no means 
unique  or optimal, but  is sufficient to illustrate our point.  References to possible 
alternative designs will be given throughout the paper. 
3.1  Continuous layer 
Conventional differential equation models are used to design continuous control laws 
at this level, which contains both the regulation and the physical layer of Figure 2. 
The  advantage of this framework is  that  it  supports  well  established  verification 
techniques in the form of mathematical proofs. The procedure used for the design 
of most of the control laws that appear in the IVHS architecture in question is to 
approximate the dynamics of a vehicle by a linear or feedback linearizable system. 
The controllers designed for this system are robust enough to take care of any un- 
modeled dynamics. This process simplifies the task of analyzing the stability and 
performance of the algorithms. The regulation layer contains six such control laws: 
-  Leader Control law: 
We assume that the platoon leaders will implement an Autonomous Intelligent 
Cruise Control (AICC) law like the one presented in [9]  3. The goal of this con- 
troller is to maintain safe inter-platoon spacing  (which is taken as  a  constant 
time headway of 1 second in  [9]) and,  if possible,  track  the  optimal velocity 
determined by the link layer (typically 60-65  miles per hour). Because the ob- 
jectives of this controller are  very similar to the objectives of human drivers, 
this control law is used as the default for a leader, i.e. ii is the law implemented 
unless there is a specific command to do otherwise. 
3 See [17] for a different design of AICC control law. 172 
-  Follower control law: 
This is the default control law for the followers in a platoon (see  [12,  32]).  Its 
task is simply to track the velocity of the vehicle in front while keeping a tight 
spacing (1 meter in this case). 
-  Merge control law: 
Merge is the action taken by two platoons that want to become one. The trailing 
platoon, that requests the merge, accelerates to catch up with the leading platoon 
and joins it. This acceleration is done according to a reference trajectory which 
is calculated based on the assumption that the preceding platoon will be moving 
at constant velocity throughout the entire maneuver. State feedback is then used 
to stabilize the closed loop system about this trajectory and hence eliminate the 
effect of any acceleration or deceleration of the leading platoon (see [9]). 
-  Split control law: 
Split is exactly the opposite of merge. A follower becomes the leader of all the 
cars  that  follow it  (in the same platoon)  and decelerates until it  reaches safe 
inter-platoon distance from the mother platoon. Like the merge control law, a 
reference open loop trajectory is calculated and then state feedback is used to 
guarantee asymptotic tracking. 
-  Change lane control law: 
Apart from the obvious lateral (steering) action, change lane also requires lon- 
gitudinal action in terms of aligning the vehicle that wishes to change lane with 
a proper gap in the target lane. This action is in principle similar to a split as 
discussed in [9]. Both the longitudinal and lateral components of this maneuver 
are carried out by controllers that are designed in the same way as the merge or 
split controllers. 
-  Lane keeping lateral control law: 
The objective of this law is to keep the vehicle in the center of the lane. This 
is achieved by means of a frequency shaped linear quadratic  (FSLQ) regulator 
[28]. 
It can be shown that each of the control laws described above leads to a closed loop 
system that  is stable  and capable of performing the desired task  adequately. The 
proofs and simulation results of this claim can be found in the appropriate references 
([9,  12, 28]). hi addition, some of these controllers have been tested experimentally 
on actual vehicles with satisfactory results. 
The continuous layer in  the  sense  of Figure 1 also contains the  physical layer 
of Figure 2.  The work presented here was  carried out under the  assumption that 
the  operation of the  sensors  and  actuators  of the  physical layer of all vehicles is 
perfect, i.e. there are no faults, no time delays, no steady state tracking error, no 
false measurements, etc. The only restrictive assumption we impose is limits on the 
ranges of the sensors and actuators. These limits are based on experimental data and 
assume ideal environmental conditions (perfect road surface and perfect weather). 
Therefore they are, if anything, optimistic given the current  technology. They are 
summarized in Table 3.1. 
As  will  become apparent  in  Section 4,  these  limits play a  crucial  role in  the 
behavior of the combined system. In particular, they imply the existence of a region 173 
Max. Acceleration  3  m/s  2 
Max. Deceleration  -5 rn/s  2 
Distance  Sensor Front  60  m 
iDistance Sensor Rear  30  m 
Distance  sensor Adjacent Lane, Front  30  m 
UDistance sensor Adjacent Lane, Rear  30  m 
Table 1. Constraints on Actuators and Sensors 
in the state space of the lead vehicle, corresponding to certain severe disturbances, 
from which the leader control law can not recover (see [9] for details). 
3.2  Discrete layer 
The discrete layer works at a more abstract level than the continuous layer. Many 
different  formalisms exist  for describing  this  layer; standard  choices  include  finite 
state machines, Petri or Neural Nets and Fuzzy Logic among others. The framework 
of most of these techniques supports methods of carrying out proofs of correctness. 
For example, a  very effective proof methocl is the  one used for the  verification of 
finite state machines. It is based on the fact that,  because of the finiteness  of the 
state space, it is possible to enumerate all possible traces that the machine accepts 
and hence verify that all possible sequences of events possess certain desirable prop- 
erties.  Tools exist in the form of computer programs that perform this verification 
task automatically. Of course the actual tools are a lot more sophisticated than the 
simplistic description given above and are designed to be computationally efficient, 
a very useful property as the machines in question often have hundreds of thousands 
or even millions of states. 
In our example we assume that the discrete layer contains only the coordination 
layer. As mentioned in the introduction a simple abstraction will be used for the link 
layer. The task of this discrete layer is to provide a consistent way of coordinating 
the maneuvers of adjacent platoons so that they are effective (vehicles get to their 
destination)  and efficient (capacity is maximized) without compromising safety. To 
facilitate the analysis and keep the problem tractable, the design in [16] distinguishes 
only three maneuvers: Merge to form a single platoon from two platoons, Split to do 
the opposite and  Change to move a  vehicle from one lane to the other. To further 
simplify the situation it is assumed that each platoon can only be involved in one 
maneuver at a time and that only free agents, that is one car platoons, can change 
lane. Clearly these assumptions lead to a rather restricted set of possible behaviors. 
It is possible to obtain alternative designs by relaxing some of them (see for exam- 
ple [14]).  However, the restrictions allow us to keep track of the problem and prove 
that the design possesses certain desirable properties. 
The coordination layer controller is supposed to carry out these three maneuvers 
efficiently and safely. To accomplish this, the coordination layer of each vehicle ex- 
changes messages with neighboring vehicles according to certain protocols (which in 174 
[16] are modeled by finite state machines). When mutual agreement (coordination) 
is reached, the coordination layer controller commands the regulation layer to carry 
out the  appropriate maneuver. The protocols were verified to posses certain desir- 
able properties using an automated software verification tool, COSPAN [11]. For the 
purpose of this verification the behavior of the continuous layer was abstracted by a 
set of finite state machines, that are supposed to model the behavior of the sensors 
and the conventional controllers from the protocol point of view. So the verification 
proved that  the  protocol  logic is  "correct"  when  coupled  with  the  abstraction  of 
the continuous layer. How closely the abstractions match the behavior of the actual 
system is still an open question. 
3.3  Interface 
Interface design is the most challenging part of a hybrid system since it straddles both 
the continuous and the discrete world. A good interface design is very important, as 
it determines to a  large extend what one can prove about the combined system. It 
may also help us extend advantages of the discrete event system theory (e.g., ease of 
computation)  to the continuous  domain and conversely (e.g., derive mathematical 
proofs in discrete space from equivalent proofs on continuous state spaces). 
In applications such as ours, the interface is usually designed last. The disadvan- 
tage of this approach is that it leads to interfaces that are case specific and whose 
performance is limited by the limitations of the rest of the design. One of the goals 
of this research is to develop a technique for systematically designing interfaces with 
desirable properties for general systems. 
In our example, the interface is a finite state machine whose transitions depend 
upon the commands from the coordination layer, the readings of the sensors (physical 
layer responses)  and the state of the continuous controllers. It plays a dual role. On 
the one side it acts as a symbol to signal translator and therefore directly influences 
the evolution of the continuous system. It receives the coordination layer commands 
(symbols)  and  uses  them  to switch  between  different  continuous  layer controllers 
(signals). In addition it keeps track of which of these controllers need to be initialized 
(symbol) and carries out this initialization by directly changing the controller state 
(signal). In the other direction the interface acts as a signal to symbol translator. It 
processes the sensory information (signal) and presents it to the coordination layer 
in an aggregate form compatible with the finite state machine formalism (symbol). 
It also monitors the evolution of the continuous system (signal) and decides if the 
maneuver in progress is safe or not. If at any stage the maneuver becomes hazardous 
it aborts the maneuver, notifies the coordination layer of its decision (symbol) and 
switches to a different continuous control law that will get the system back to a safe 
configuration. 
Unfortunately there is no systematic way of verifying the complete interface. [20] 
describes the verification of the discrete part of the interface, where the continuous 
state considerations  are either ignored or abstracted.  However, the addition of the 
actual continuous effects to the framework in a consistent way is not supported  by 
the current  theory. 175 
The only way of testing the behavior of the combined system at the moment is 
by simulation. Even though successful simulation results  are not nearly as good as 
a mathematical proof of the properties of the system, a failure in the simulation can 
be considered  as a  proof of a shortcoming of the design.  This approach is used  in 
the next section to point out problems in the IVHS design outlined above. 
4  Properties  of Combined  System 
The design described  above was put to test by implementing it in simulation. The 
result was the dedicated simulator SmartPath, described in [7]. An effort was made to 
make the simulator as flexible and modular as possible so that changes in the design 
(e.g., alternative regulation layer controllers) can be implemented easily. Using this 
tool, long simulations for a variety of initial conditions and inputs and a few choices 
of simplified link  layer  design  were  carried  out.  Contrary  to  our  expectation  we 
observed quite  a  few scenarios  where  the  performance of the  system was  inferior 
to the one predicted  by the individual level analysis, for example, unpredicted  car 
crashes occurred. We now document these different scenarios. 
4.1  Changing from a  slow to  a  fast  lane 
According to the coordination layer design, only free agents (single vehicle platoons) 
are allowed to change lane. Before a vehicle initiates a lane change it looks (through 
its sensors)  to the adjacent lane to make sure that there is room for it there.  If no 
vehicle is visible in the sensor range the move is initiated immediately. If a  vehicle 
is found and its distance is less than the safe inter-platoon spacing, communication 
is established  to coordinate the maneuver. This goes on until a  gap twice as large 
as the safe inter-platoon spacing is found. Then the lane change takes place in the 
middle of this gap. 
F-1 
2  *  Inter-platoon Distance (A) 
Fig. 3. Change lane from a slow to a fast lane 
Fast  Lane  -  30 m/sec 
Slow  Lane  -  10 m/sec 
In most situations this arrangement should cause no problems. Indeed both the 
protocol  that  coordinates  the  maneuver and  the  regulation  layer controllers  that 
align the free agent with a gap in the next lane have been proven to perform well. 
Consider however the scenario shown in Figure 3. Free agent A switches from a slow 
lane to a fast lane. During the change a gap big enough for A to move into is present 176 
in the fast lane (for example no vehicle is visible in the sensor range). It is conceivable 
however that a  vehicle (denoted  by B)  is present in the fast lane behind A, which, 
after the lane change  is complete, finds  itself just  outside  A's lateral sensor range 
(say 35m)  and  moving a  lot faster than  A  (say 30m/s as opposed to  lOm/s).  It 
turns out that the AICC lead controller is incapable of recovering from such drastic 
initial conditions, so a crash is inevitable. 4 
We were  able to create  this  kind of crash  in  a  relatively light traffic situation 
by asking many vehicles to change lanes  at the same time in order  to leave at  an 
intersection.  As the  vehicles need to be free agents before they change lane, many 
splits were carried  out which inevitably lead to a  large deceleration in the lane of 
origin. This deceleration was not present in the target lane however, so, after a few 
seconds, the vehicles in the target lane found themselves moving a lot faster than the 
vehicles in the origin lane. Crashes of the kind described above were then observed. 
An example of this scenario is given in  Figure 7  (where  each  point represents  the 
position of a vehicle at the given time instant). 
4.2  Changing  from a  fast to a  slow lane 
This  is  a  mirror image of the  situation  of previous case.  In this  case  (Figure 4), 
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Fig. 4. Change lane from a fast to a slow lane 
vehicle B  changes lane and hits a  slow moving (or stalled)  vehicle A from behind. 
During the lane change vehicle A was just outside the range of the forward adjacent 
lane sensor  of B. After the change was complete the front sensor of B  reveals the 
presence of A  but  it  is already too late to stop. The scenarios that  might lead  to 
such a crash are the same as the ones of Section 4.1, with the origin and target lanes 
interchanged. 
It turns out that it is very difficult to create a crash like this using the current 
version of SmartPath. Figure 13 shows an extreme case where a stalled vehicle is seen 
at the edge of the front sensor range (60  m). The optimum velocity commanded by 
the link layer is too high for the second vehicle to stop in time and therefore a crash 
is unavoidable. 
4 Note that the safe inter-platoon spacing for a vehicle is affine in its velocity. In Figure 3, 
the safe inter-platoon spacing is 20 m for vehicle A but 40 m for vehicle B. 177 
4.3  Merging to a  decelerating platoon 
Before  Merge 
spe~ (A) = Spe~A  (S) = speed  (c) 
d(A, B2) = d(B,C2) =Inter-platoon Distance (A)  = Iraer-platoon Distance (B) 
i Inter-platoon  Distance (A)  ,~  i lnter-platoon  Distance (B)  i 
During Merge 
Speed (C) <  Speed (13) << Speed (A) 
B,C Decelerating  ;  A Accelerating 
d (A,B2) <<  Inter-platoon Distance (A) 
A  Crashes  onto B2 
Decelerating  Accelerating  Decelerating 
Fig. 5. Crash during Merge maneuver 
With  the  merge control  law  described  in  Section 3.1,  changes  in  the  velocity of 
the front platoon should cause no problem as the state feedback takes care of any 
deviations from the desired  trajectory. However, the  actual trajectory  will deviate 
from the desired one if the limits of the actuators  (throttle and brake)  are reached. 
To  avoid this  possibility,  the  interface  aborts  the  maneuver  when  it  detects  the 
danger of actuator saturation  (see  [20]).  After aborting the maneuver, the system 
should  find itself in  a  position from which  it can continue safely under  the  AICC 
lead control law. The simulation indicates that under extreme conditions this may 
not  be true and merging may cause a  major hazard.  We were able to recreate two 
such scenarios. 
In the first case we created a large deceleration in a lane by making the simplified 
link layer ask many of the vehicles in the adjacent lanes to move to the lane in ques- 
tion. The vehicles already in the lane were then forced to decelerate to create space 
for the incoming vehicles. In the second scenario we caused a large deceleration by 
asking many of the vehicles in a densely occupied lane to exit. As already discussed 
this caused  a  number of splits in the platoons as the vehicles tried to become free 
agents in order to change lanes. In both situations the deceleration built up enough 
to cause saturation of the actuators. Therefore merging vehicles upstream of the dis- 
ruption were forced to abort their maneuvers. This led to a situation where vehicles 178 
(like vehicle A in Figure 5) found themselves close to the preceding platoon (B-B2) 
which  is  already decelerating at  the maximum rate,  while moving faster  than it. 
Hence, even though A decelerates at saturation level as well, a crash is unavoidable. 
A situation where such a crash is observed is shown in Figures 9 and 10. 
Note: Vehicle crashes  associated  with merge maneuver were  also predicted by A. 
Hitchcock (see [15]) using fault tree analysis  method. 
4.4  Multiple lane changes from a  single platoon 
The situation described above, where many vehicles wish to change out of a lane thus 
creating multiple splits, caused yet another kind of crash. The scenario is outlined 
in Figure 6. 
A platoon breaks up so that vehicles B, C and D can leave the lane. The current 
interface declares a  split maneuver complete the  moment the  deceleration begins. 
This allows the coordination layer to initiate a lane change maneuver while the split 
deceleration is taking place. This is done to improve the rate at which vehicles leave 
the lane. However, it is conceivable that three splits will occur before a lane change 
is initiated. So B, C and D will all become free agents one after the other. This will 
cause no problem as long as the vehicles stay in the lane. Suppose though that  all 
three of them want to move to the next lane. As discussed above they will all look 
at the target lane through their sensors and, assuming they find it empty, will all 
start moving over at roughly the same time. If D reaches the target lane first it will 
start accelerating to get back to the optimum speed. In the meantime C, which has 
been decelerating because of the split maneuver, reaches the target lane. As a result 
D  finds itself very close to C  and moving slightly faster.  It is very likely that this 
situation might lead to a crash. Indeed Figure 11 shows the results of a simulation 
where  such  a  crash  was  observed.  It should  be  noted that  crashes  like these  are 
typically not severe, as the relative velocity at impact is likely to be very small. 
4.5  Crash  Analysis 
The common feature of all the crashes described above is that  they are caused by 
continuous layer performance not accounted for by the discrete layer. In  all cases 
this leads to the discrete layer making requests that are incompatible with the cur- 
rent situation of the continuous layer, such  as a  potentially dangerous  maneuver. 
The situations in Sections 4.1  and 4.2  arise because the limits on the sensor range 
and the continuous time controller performance are not represented adequately by 
the corresponding coordination layer abstractions.  The same is true for the situa- 
tion in 4.3, only instead of the sensor limits the problem here arises because of the 
actuator limits. Finally, the problem in Section 4.4 is caused by the fact that the 
coordination layer implicitly assumes that, during a lane change, vehicles in the ori- 
gin lane will already be at a safe distance, an assumption related to the continuous 
layer. As  a  result it does not establish  communication with them and therefore is 
.oblivious of their intention to change lanes. 
Clearly most of these crashes could have been avoided by changes in the controller 
design  (see  Section 4.6).  This fact however is  besides  the  point.  For one,  ad-hoc 179 
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changes like that  might have unpredictable effect on other aspects  of the  system 
performance (e.g., capacity). More importantly, the simulation results demonstrated 
that, even though the individual layers have been verified independently to exclude 
certain undesirable kinds of behavior, the combined system is capable of producing 
them. It should also be noted here that the list of faults presented above is by no 
means exhaustive. The fact that we were able to identify only the above scenarios 
as dangerous does not mean that there do not exist other situations that may lead 
to unpredictable  catastrophes.  These observations naturally lead  to  the  question 
to what extent can one trust the conventional discrete and continuous verification 
techniques when it comes to hybrid systems. Clearly if any faith is to be placed in 
the IVHS design presented here, a  proof of its performance claims is needed. The 
above discussion indicates that such a proof is not possible using conventional tools. 
As already mentioned the link layer designs used in the simulation were extremely 
simple. One might feel that the crashes could have been avoided with a more realistic 
and intelligent link layer design. To make the design less sensitive to faults such as 
roadside  to vehicle communication breakdowns,  we would like  to avoid assigning 
such a safety critical role to the link layer. In any case, the performance claims made 
by the verification of the individual layers about the coordination-regulation layer 
interaction are independent of the link layer design. 180 
It should be noted here that the above discussion should not give the impression 
that  car  crashes  are  a  common occurrence  in  the  proposed IVHS design.  In fact 
they  are  rather  rare  and  occur  only under  special, extreme conditions,  which  we 
mostly set up specifically in order to observe the crashes. Statistically speaking the 
crash described  in Section 4.3  is the most common. Crashes of the kind described 
in Section 4.1 are rather rare and only happen under extreme conditions. The same 
is true  for the  crashes  described  in  Section 4.4  which  are even more rare.  Finally 
crashes like the ones in Section 4.2 are very rare indeed and are only observed under 
scenarios that were artificially created. 
4.6  Redesign of IVHS  controller for safety 
Some of the crashes  have simple solutions. For example to exclude the scenario in 
Section 4.4, we could ask the interface to declare the split maneuver complete (thus 
allowing the initiation of a new maneuver) after  the splitting platoon has decelerated 
all the way to safe spacing. 5 This will increase the amount of time needed for a lane 
change and the  amount of disturbance  to upstream vehicles. The link layer design 
has  to  take  this  into  account  in  deciding  how far  away it  has  to  command lane 
changes so that vehicles do not miss their exits. 
In the case of merge, the merging vehicle goes from one safe state  (large inter- 
platoon  distance)  to  another  (small intra-platoon  distance)  via  an  unsafe  region 
(close  to  the  vehicle  ahead  and  moving faster).  If a  large  disturbance  is  created 
downstream  when  the  merging vehicle is in  the  unsafe  region,  then  aborting  the 
merge maneuver may result in a  crash.  There are two ways of avoiding this prob- 
lem. The total number of maneuvers in a  section can be restricted  so that  a  large 
disturbance  is never created for vehicles upstream. This is not a good solution as it 
involves controlling traffic downstream of the vehicle, it assigns a safety critical role 
to the link layer and its effectiveness is difficult to prove formally. The second so- 
lution, presented in [8], involves redesigning the merge maneuver trajectory so that 
regardless of the  disturbance  downstream,  the  merge maneuver is  never  aborted. 
The merge trajectory of [8] is designed to avoid any high s relative velocity collisions. 
Obviously, this trajectory takes longer to complete than the minimum time trajec- 
tory of [9]. The redesigned merge maneuver guarantees safe operation but it has an 
adverse effect on capacity. 
Lane change introduces  the most complicated disturbance.  With the bound on 
maximum deceleration  given by -5m/s ~, a simple calculation shows that  it takes 
90m for a vehicle to stop from 30m/sec. One way to avoid crashes due to lane changes 
across lanes with speed differential is to increase the range of lateral communication 
devices  and  lateral  distance  and  velocity sensors  to  90m in  all directions  (lateral 
front, lateral rear, left and right), hnplementation of this solution could be possible 
i  Another  alternative  is  to  extend  the  lane  change  protocol  to  include  communication 
between vehicles in your own lane. This will have less impact on capacity but it increases 
the comple:dty of the communication protocol. 
6 A mapping between relative velocity of collision and the severity of an accident is obtained 
in [13]. An accident is assumed to be safe if the resulting  passenger injury does not require 
hospitalization.  Based on real accident  data, it is concluded  that  all  accidents  with a 
relative crash velocity less than 3.3 m/sec are safe in the above sense. 181 
using  cameras for lateral  distance  and  velocity sensing [18]. The interface should 
also be changed to include a safety check that looks at relative velocity along with 
relative distance from vehicles in the next lane before deciding to change lane. This 
also means that lane changes should be prohibited at places on the highway which 
does not allow wide range of lateral sensing, e.g. near sharp curves. This scheme will 
reduce the number of successful lane changes and consequently affect the capacity 
of the overall system. 
5  Concluding  Remarks 
Summarizing the  above results,  the regulation  and  coordination  (continuous and 
discrete) layers of the IVHS architecture shown in Figure 2 were independently de- 
veloped and then combined by an interface. At each level (discrete, continuous and 
interface) verification of desirable properties was carried out using the appropriate 
tools. However, contrary to expectations, problems were detected in the combined 
system performance by simulation. The problems were due to the fact that the dis- 
crete layer can only comprehend abstractions of the continuous layer. As a result it 
does not take sufficiently into account certain continuous layer parameters, which in 
our case were the sensor and actuator ranges and the controller performance bounds. 
These observations led to the conclusion that in order to fully trust the design we 
need verification tools that test the performance of the combined hybrid system. 
Computer aided verification of timed systems [1]  and hybrid systems [2, 29] is 
currently an active area of research. For verification, the actual behaviors of the hy- 
brid systems are usually abstracted into a finite set of behaviors. Thus one trajectory 
of the abstraction will include many possible system trajectories which are  "close" 
to it in some sense.  This is a  promising development as,  for example, it could be 
used in the context of IVHS to prove that a particular design will not produce any 
crashes in normal mode. It should be noted however that the application of such a 
technique to the current design may be inconclusive as the failure of the verification 
may be attributed to either a faulty design or over-abstraction. 
In terms of progress in the IVHS problem, the simulation results may also sug- 
gest considerations to be taken into account by the link layer. For example, while 
dealing with an accident downstream, it might seem natural to declare all vehicles 
in a platoon to be free agents in order to try and get as many of them out of this 
lane as possible. But this will create successive splits and excessive decelerations for 
vehicles further upstream. Under these conditions, crashes like the ones described 
in Sections 4.1 mad 4.3 will be possible. Similarly, downstream from an accident, ve- 
hicles will want  to move from the congested  (free) lane to the nearly empty lane 
(where the accident was). This may again lead to the same type of crashes.  Finally, 
the risks associated with the merge maneuver may be unavoidable without extensive 
redesign, as the cause of deceleration (e.g. splitting of platoons downstream etc.) are 
uncontrollable and can occur any time during the merge ~. These results also indi- 
cate that the performance of the current design, even with the link layer, may not be 
r There exists a different scheme of organizing traffic without merge maneuver due to A. 
Hitchcock  [14]. This architecture is currently under investigation.  It will probably still 
be vulnerable  to crashes during lane changes. 182 
robust enough to deal with certain situations.  We collectively refer to such extreme 
conditions as  "degraded modes of operation". More work is currently in progress to 
provide alternatives  to the current  design in order to deal with these scenarios [21]. 
Acknowledgment:  The authors  would like to thank  Farokh Eskafi,  Delnaz Khor- 
ramabadi, Dr. Bobby Rao and Prof. Pravin Varaiya for helpful discussions providing 
insight into the problem. 
References 
1.  R. Alur, C. Courcoubetis, and D. Dill. Model checking for real-time systems.  Logic in 
Computer Science,  pages 414-425,  1990. 
2.  R. Alur, C. Courcoubetis, T. A. Henzinger,  and P. H. Ho.  Hybrid automaton: An algo- 
rithmic approach to the specification and verification of hybrid systems.  In Robert L. 
Grossman,  Anil Nerode,  Anders P.  Ravn,  and Hans Rischel,  editors,  Hybrid System, 
pages 209-229. Springer Verlag,  New York,  1993. 
3.  Allen Back, John Guckenheimer, and Mark Myers.  A dynamical simulation facility for 
hybrid systems.  Technical Report 92-6, Come]] University,  April 1992. 
4.  V. Borkar, M. S. Branicky, and S. K. Mitter.  A unified framework for hybrid control. 
(preprlnt). 
5.  R. W. Brockett.  Hybrid models for motion control systems.  In H.L.Trentelman and 
J.C.Willems,  editors,  Essays on  Control: Perspectives  in the  Theory and its Applica- 
tions, pages 29-54. Birkhauser,  Boston, 1993. 
6.  R. W. Broekett.  Pulse  driven dynamical systems.  In A. Isidori  and  T.J.  Tam,  edi- 
tors, Systems, Models and Feedback: Theory and Applications,  pages 73-80. Birkhauser, 
Boston, 1993. 
7.  Farokh Eskafi,  Delnaz Khorramabadi, and Pravin Varaiya.  SmartPath: An automated 
highway system simulator.  PATH Technical Report UCB-ITS-94-4. Institute of Trans- 
portation Studies,  University of California,  Berkeley,  1994. 
8.  J. Frankel,  L. Alvarez, R. Horowitz, and P. Li.  Robust platoon maneuvers for AVHS. 
(preprint),  November 1994. 
9.  Datta N. Godbole and John Lygeros. Longitudinal control of the lead car of a platoon. 
IEEE Transactions  on  Vehicular  Technology, 43(4):1125-1135,  1994. 
10.  Robert L. Grossman, Anil Nerode, Anders P. Ravn, and Hans Rischel.  Hybrid Systems. 
Springer Verlag,  1993. 
11.  Z. Har'E1 and R.P. Kurshan.  Cospan User's  Guide.  AT~T Bell  Laboratories, 1987. 
12.  J. K. Hedrick, D.MeMahon, V. Narendran, and D. Swaroop. Longitudinal vehicle con- 
troller  design for IVHS system.  In American  Control  Conference,  pages 3107-3112, 
1991. 
13.  A. Hitchcock.  Intelligent  vehicle/bdghway  system safety: Multiple  collisions  in  AHS 
systems.  PATH Technical Report,  Institute of Transportation  Studies,  University of 
California, Berkeley,  CA, 1994. 
14.  A. Hitchcock.  A specification of an automated freeway with vehicle-borne intelligence. 
PATH  Technical  Report  UCB-ITS-PRR-92-18,  Institute  of Transportation  Studies, 
University of California,  Berkeley,  1994. 
15.  Anthony Hitchcock.  Casualties  in accidents occuring during split  and merge maneu- 
vers.  PATH Technical Memorandum 93-9, Institute of Transportation Studies, Univer- 
sity of California,  Berkeley,  1993. 183 
16.  Ann Hsu,  Farokh Eskafi,  Sonia Sachs,  and  Pravin  Varaiya.  Protocol  design  for an 
automated highway system.  Discrete Event Dynamic  Systems, 2(1):183-206,  1994. 
17.  P. Ioannou, Z. Xu, S. Eckert, D. Clemons, and T. Sieja.  Intelligent cruise control: The- 
ory and  experiments.  In IEEE  Control and Decision  Conference, pages  1885-1890, 
1993. 
18.  D. Koller,  T. Luong, and J. Mafik.  Binocular stereopsis and lane marker flow for vehi- 
cle navigation: Lateral and longitudinal  control.  Technical Report UCB/CSD-94-804, 
University of California,  Berkeley,  1994. 
19.  M. Lemmon, J. A. Stiver,  and P. J. Antsaklis.  Event identification and intelligent  hy- 
brid control.  In Robert L. Grossman, Anil Nerode, Anders P. Ravn, and Hans Rischel, 
editors,  Hybrid System, pages 268-296.  Springer Verlag,  New York, 1993. 
20.  John Lygeros and Datta N.  Godbole.  An interface between continuous and discrete- 
event controllers for vehicle automation.  In American Control Conference, pages 801- 
805,  1994. 
21.  John Lygeros, Datta N. Godbole, and Mireille  E. Broucke.  Design of an extended ar- 
chitecture for degraded modes of operation of IVHS. In American Control Conference, 
1995.  To Appear. 
22.  A. S.  Morse.  Supervisory control of family of linear  set point  controllers.  In IEEE 
Control and Decision Conference, pages 1055-1060,  1993. 
23.  Kumpati S. Narendra  and Jayendran Balakrishnan.  Improving transient  response of 
adaptive control systems using multiple  models and switching.  In IEEE Control and 
Decision Conference, pages 1067-1072,  1993. 
24.  A. Nerode and W. Kohn.  Models for hybrid systems: Automata, topologies, controlla- 
bility,  observabihty.  In Robert L. Grossman, Anil Nerode, Anders P. Ravn, and Hans 
Rischet,  editors,  Hybrid System, pages 317-356. Springer Verlag,  New York, 1993. 
25.  A. Nerode and  W. Kohn.  Multiple  agent hybrid  control architecture.  In Robert L. 
Grossman,  Anil Nerode, Anders P.  Ravn, and Hans Rischel,  editors,  Hybrid System, 
pages 297-316. Springer Verlag, New York,  1993. 
26.  K. M. Passino and P. J. Antsaklis.  Modeling and analysis of artificially intelligent plan- 
ning systems.  In Panos J. Antsaklis  and Kevin M. Passino,  editors,  An Introduction 
to Intelligent  and Autonomous  Control, pages 191-214.  Kluwer Academic Publishing, 
Boston,  1993. 
27.  Kevin M.  Passino and Alfonsus D. Lunardhi.  Stability analysis of expert  control sys- 
tems.  In IEEE Control and Decision Conference, pages 765-770,  1993. 
28.  H. Peng and M. Tomizuka.  Vehicle lateral  control for highway automation.  In Ameri. 
can Control Conference, pages 788-794,  1990. 
29.  Anuj Purl and Pravin Varaiya.  Decidebility of hybrid systems with rectangular differ- 
ential inclusions.  In Computer Aided Verification, pages 95-104, 1994. 
30.  P. J. G. Ramadge and W. M. Wonham.  The control of discrete event dynamical sys- 
tems.  Proceedings of IEEE, Vol.77(1):81-98, 1989. 
31.  B. S. Y. Rao and Pravin Varaiya.  Roadside intelligence  for flow control in an IVHS. 
Transportation Research - C, 2(1):49-72, 1994. 
32.  Shahab  Sheikholeslam  and  Charles A. Desoer.  Longitudinal  control of a  platoon of 
vehicles.  In American  Control Conference, pages 291-297,  1990. 
33.  Lucio Tavernini.  Differential  automata and their simulators.  Nonlinear Analysis,  The- 
ory, Methods and Applications, Vo1.11(6):665-683,  1987. 
34.  P. Varaiya and Steven E.  Shladover.  Sketch of an IVHS systems architecture.  Tech- 
rdcal  Report  UCB-ITS-PRR-91-3, Institute  of Transportation  Studies,  University  of 
California,  Berkeley,  1991. 
35.  Pravin Varaiya.  Smart cars on smart roads: problems of control.  IEEE Transactions 
on Automatic Control, AC-38(2):195-207, 1993. 184 
A  Simulation Results 
Distance x 103 
Crash During Lane Change 
2.20 
2.10 
2.00 
1.90 
1.80 
1.70 
1.60 
1.50 
1.40 
1.30 
1.20 
1.10 
1.00 
0.90 
0.80 
0.70 
0.60 
0.50 
0.40 
0.30 
0.20 
,,  ///////////~,/// 
'  "r 
,, 
,  //////,~'//~" 
///~ ,i/////~, 
////////~  ~//// 
//////////////'A 
20.00  40.00  60.00  80.00  100.00 
lane3.dat 
Time 
Fig. 7. Lane change from slow to fast lane: the crash occurs at 86.91 seconds at a  distance 
of 1870  meters. The next figure shows a  close up view of the crash 185 
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Fig. 13. Distance-Time  plot of lane I: crash at 94.31 seconds and 1880 meters is similar in 
nature  to the case of "changing  from a fast to a slow lane" 